УГОЛОВНО-ПРАВОВАЯ ХАРАКТЕРИСТИКА И СОЦИАЛЬНО-ПРАВОВАЯ СУЩНОСТЬ ИСПОЛЬЗОВАНИЯ ИСКУССТВЕННОГО ИНТЕЛЛЕКТА В ПРЕСТУПНЫХ ЦЕЛЯХ

Authors

  • Kurbanov Marufjon Mamadaminovich

Keywords:

artificial intelligence, elements of crime, modus operandi, form of guilt, algorithmic liability, risk-based approach, transnational crime, algorithmic transparency, cybercrime

Abstract

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the criminal-legal characterization and socio-legal nature of the use of artificial intelligence (AI) for criminal purposes. The study argues that artificial intelligence does not constitute an independent element of a crime but functions as a means or method of committing criminal acts. Particular attention is paid to the transformation of the objective and subjective elements of crime, including the complication of the modus operandi, the determination of guilt (intent or negligence), and the establishment of causal links. The article examines challenges associated with generative AI technologies, deepfake systems, algorithmic decision-making mechanisms, and automated digital tools that contribute to the emergence of new forms of criminal activity. It emphasizes the need to preserve the principle of technological neutrality in criminal law while adapting existing legal norms to the realities of the digital environment. The research further analyzes the relevance of the “risk-based approach,” the “effective control” criterion, and algorithmic transparency in determining criminal liability. Special consideration is given to the transnational nature of AI-related crimes and the resulting jurisdictional and international cooperation issues. The author proposes normative reforms, including mandatory risk assessments for high-risk AI systems, algorithmic auditing mechanisms, strengthened human oversight requirements, and the introduction of special professional liability standards. The study concludes that the phenomenon of artificial intelligence does not undermine the conceptual foundations of criminal law but necessitates their modernization in light of technological developments.

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Published

2026-04-28