THE ROLE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGIES IN THE MECHANISM OF CRIME: ISSUES OF INSTRUMENT, METHOD, AND CRIMINAL QUALIFICATION
Keywords:
artificial intelligence, instrument of crime, method of committing an offence, generative artificial intelligence, algorithmic autonomy, deepfake, technological neutrality, culpability, causation, human control, cybercrime, legal qualification of an offenceAbstract
This article examines the role of artificial intelligence technologies in the mechanism of criminal offending through the relationship between the traditional criminal-law categories of an “instrument of crime” and a “method of committing an offence.” The central issue addressed is whether the generative, automated, adaptive and relatively autonomous characteristics of artificial intelligence still allow it to be treated merely as a conventional technical instrument, or whether such features require a reconsideration of the traditional instrumental approach developed in criminal law. The study provides a comparative analysis of domestic and foreign legal scholarship, the criminal legislation currently in force in the Republic of Uzbekistan, and international approaches to the regulation of artificial intelligence. It is argued that the criminal-law significance of artificial intelligence should be determined not by the designation of the technology itself, but by the function it performs within a particular criminal mechanism, the degree of human control, and the level of algorithmic autonomy. On this basis, the article proposes a “functional-instrumental model” and an analytical framework for the criminal-law assessment of AI-assisted conduct based on the sequence: “purpose – function – control – autonomy – outcome – causation – culpability.” The article further argues in favour of preserving the principle of technological neutrality rather than treating the use of artificial intelligence as a universal qualifying circumstance, while recognising its distinct criminal-law significance where AI qualitatively increases the scale, impact or degree of automation of the offence.
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Ўзбекистон Республикасининг Жиноят кодекси. 168-модда; XX¹ боб – «Ахборот технологиялари соҳасидаги жиноятлар». Қонунчилик маълумотлари миллий базаси. https://lex.uz/ru/docs/111453 (Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan. Article 168; Chapter XX¹ – “Crimes in the Field of Information Technologies.” National Database of Legislation. https://lex.uz/ru/docs/111453)
